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Abstract
The welfare effects of private equity transactions are debated controversially.
We analyze the impact of expansion financing and buyouts by private equity
investors on investment of portfolio firms in the UK and France – two coun-
tries with different financial systems. Unobserved heterogeneity and the
endogeneityofprivateequitytransactionsfinancedbyventurecapitalcompa-
nies are addressed using dynamic panel data techniques.In both countries we
find that portfolio firms display higher investment levels and a lower depend-
enceoninternalfundsafterexpansionfinancing.Buyoutsfinancedbyventure
capital companies are neither associated with a decrease in investment spend-
ingnorwithanincreaseinthedependenceoninternalfinance.Incontrary,pri-
vate equity based buyouts in the UK outperform non-private equity backed
British firms in terms of both indicators.Contrasting the notion of several pol-
icy makers,we cannot detect that private equity based buyout financing yields
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1  Introduction 
The growing number of leveraged buyouts (LBOs) and the accompanying growth of private 
equity markets before the turmoil in the debt markets in 2008 have raised a controversial 
debate.  Particularly in Europe, there is an ongoing discussion about regulation of private 
equity transactions. Examples are a Green Paper by the European Commission (2005) and a 
famous speech of Germany’s former vice chancellor Franz Müntefering, who equated private 
equity investors with locusts and stated that those investors would hollow out companies for 
their own benefit.
2 It is often argued that the high amount of debt used to finance a private 
equity transaction, which is usually secured by the portfolio firm´s assets or future cash flows, 
may lead to financial constraints and firm distress.  
 
In contrast, theoretical and empirical contributions suggest that ownership changes shift 
resources to more efficient uses and more active managers (Harris et al., 2005; Jovanovic and 
Rousseau, 2008). Private equity investors may increase a firm’s access to financial resources 
and in addition, these investors can reduce information asymmetries in financial markets by 
improving governance mechanisms in funded firms. The latter argument is based on active 
monitoring implemented via significant board rights of private equity investors and high 
incentives for its management to improve the profitability of the portfolio firm (e.g., 
Cumming et al., 2007; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009).  
 
Related to that, Brown and Petersen (2009) show that financial constraints, approximated by 
investment-cash flow sensitivities, decreased for US quoted manufacturing  rms between 
1970 and 2006. The authors argue that this decline is mainly due to improvements in capital 
markets. Agca and Mozumdar (2008b) find that increasing fund flows of insurance 
companies, pension funds, mutual funds and closed-end funds decreases investment-cash flow 
sensitivities of portfolio companies. Further, the authors detect that institutional ownership 
also reduces the sensitivity of investment to internal funds.  
 
Our paper investigates the link between private equity investors, financial constraints and 
investment spending empirically. Surprisingly the impact of private equity on investment and 
                                                 
2 See e.g. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/29/business/worldbusiness/29equity.html?fta=y (accessed February 
15, 2009).   5
financial constraints has yet only been investigated for early stage investments (Bertoni et al. 
2008, Manigart et al. 2003). To the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical study that 
analyzes the role of expansion financing and private equity based buyouts on investment and 
financial constraints of portfolio firms systematically.
3 Our paper aims to fill this gap. We 
further contribute to the current debate and the existing literature on private equity and 
venture capital by comparing the effects of both expansion financing and buyouts across 
countries including a country with a “market based” financial system and a well-developed 
private equity market, the UK, and a country with a less developed private equity market and 
a “bank based” financial system, France.  
 
To evaluate the impact of private equity investors on investment and financial constraints, we 
estimate an investment equation which is derived from a sales accelerator model (see e.g., 
Harhoff, 1998; Mairesse et al., 1999). To take into account unobserved firm heterogeneity in 
general and the endogenous nature of private equity investments and other variables, the 
investment equations are estimated by generalized method of moments (GMM) techniques 
using lagged levels of the regressors and additional variables as instruments. Our empirical 
framework is applied to a large panel data set that covers firms from France and the UK over 
the period 1998-2007. Our results suggest that private equity backed transaction on average 
alleviate financial constraints and induce higher investment in portfolio firms. Splitting 
private equity transactions into buyouts and expansion investment, we find higher investment 
rates and a lower dependence on internal funds for firms in the UK after a buyout, while 
investment in buyout firms does not differ significantly from non-private equity financed 
firms in France. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section two, we provide a brief review on the 
literature on the effects of private equity on the performance of portfolio firms and derive our 
hypotheses. Section three describes our empirical model, sections four provides a description 
of the data. Results of the econometric analysis are presented in section five, section six 
concludes.  
                                                 
3 Some empirical studies analyse the relationship between management buyouts - which are often but not always 
conducted in cooperation with private equity investors - and capital expenditures (Smith 1990, Kaplan 1990), 
productivity (Harris et al. 2005) and employment growth (Amess and Wright 2007). Recently, Davis et al. 
(2008) and Boucly et al. (2008) analyze differences in employment growth rates between firms affected by a 
private equity-financed leveraged buyout and other firms.   6
2  The economic role of financial intermediaries in funded firms 
2.1  Theoretical background 
Venture capitalists (VCs) raise funds from corporate investors or financial companies like 
banks, insurance companies or pension funds and provide private equity to the selected firms 
(portfolio firms). They hold the shares for about five years on average (see e.g., Manigart et 
al., 2002) and realize returns on private equity investment via selling their shares to other 
investors. Private equity investments of VCs are typically differentiated in venture capital 
financing on the one hand and financing of buyouts, turnaround or extensive restructuring on 
the other hand. Venture capital financing addresses the financing of new firms to realize 
market entry (early stage) and the market expansion of companies (expansion stage).
4 
Financing of later stage transactions is mostly dominated by buyout financing. While 
shareholder (e.g. founders, families, firms) plan to phase out ownership, an existing 
management or an external management acquires shares on nominal equity with the help of 
VCs. While usually only a small fraction of debt is used to finance expansion financing which 
often comprises an increase in share capital, buyouts are usually financed with a share of debt 
between 60 and 90 per cent (Kaplan and Strömberg 2009).    
 
Seminal work by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) for the credit market and Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and Myers and Majluf (1984) for the equity market point out that financial markets are 
characterized by information asymmetries between firms and financiers. If information 
asymmetries exist, the Modigliani-Miller theorem (Modigliani and Miller 1958), which is 
based on the assumption of perfect capital markets and predicts that the source of financing is 
irrelevant for investment decisions, does not hold. New institutional economic theory and 
finance theory suggest that specialized financial intermediaries like VCs are able to reduce 
some of these information asymmetries between entrepreneurs and financiers effectively. 
Risk-pooling (Amit et al., 1998), risk-diversification (Diamond, 1984, Norton and 
Tenenbaum, 1993), specialization (Chan 1983) and the better opportunity to syndicate 
investments (Lerner 1994) are the main arguments that explain that VCs have an advantage in 
screening potential targets, contracting, monitoring and advising selected portfolio firms 
compared to other investors (see e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer 1994 and Kaplan and Strömberg, 
2001, 2009 for details). 
                                                 
4 Note that the term venture capitalist includes firms that engage in venture capital financing and in buyout 
financing.   7
 
Three main arguments could be put forward for an outperformance of private equity financed 
firms: (i) provision of sufficient financial resources, (ii) monitoring and management support 
and (iii) signaling effects. Given that a VC decides to invest in a firm, the funded firm 
receives the capital within a short time period. VCs do not only provide capital but also 
management services (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989).
5 VCs usually monitor their portfolio 
firms intensively and obtain regular reports on performance, visit the firm and attend board 
meetings. The governance structure is beneficial to reduce agency costs and to improve 
operating efficiency of funded firms. While VCs mostly offer carried interest
6 to portfolio 
managers, the management of these portfolio companies has a high incentive to handle the 
value creation process successfully. In fact, many portfolio firms perform poorly at the time 
of acquisition and VCs use their board rights to replace the management team (Kaplan and 
Strömberg 2001). VCs might also provide value-added resources for their portfolio firms 
indirectly: investments of VCs can signalize firm’s quality for uninformed third parties (e.g. 
banks, supplier, customers) implying a better access to external resources for portfolio firms 
(Stuart et al., 1999).  
 
2.2  Previous empirical findings 
Several empirical studies deal with the economic effects of VCs. Among others, Kortum and 
Lerner (2000) find that private equity investments of VCs spur innovation activities at the 
industry level. Recently, Engel and Keilbach (2007) discussed empirical findings at the firm 
level and argued that the high sophisticated screening procedure of VCs may drive the 
majority of the difference between private equity financed and non-private equity financed 
firms. Based on a matching procedure, they find that the early stage financed start-ups in their 
sample attained an annual employment growth rate that is 16% higher than in their 
comparison group. This is remarkably lower compared to other studies, e.g. Lerner (1999). 
They find no significant differences between the number of patents as well as the probability 
of a patent application between early stage financed start-ups and other firms.  
 
                                                 
5 Several studies dealt with the management advice of VCs in detail (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992; Hellmann 
and Puri, 2002, to mention a few). 
6 Carried interest is well known as the 80/20 rule. According to this rule, investors receive 80 percent of profits, 
while 20 percent of profits, known as carried interest, are received by the portfolio management of the VC.    8
While positive effects of early stage investments for start-ups and young firms by private 
equity investors are accepted by most researchers, the impacts of buyouts financed by private 
equity investors are less clear. With respect to later stage investments of private equity 
investors, an increasing number of studies has been published in recent years (Cumming et al., 
2007 and Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009 summarize much of this literature). Harris et al. (2005) 
find that ownership changes in management buyouts
7 enhance labor and total factor 
productivity at the plant level, but they do not differentiate between private equity and non-
private equity backed deals. They provide some evidence that this results from downsizing the 
workforce and outsourcing of intermediate production stages. Amess and Wright (2007a, 
2007b) do not find significantly lower employment growth of buyout firms after a buyout 
transaction. In contrast to these findings, Boucly et al. (2009) detect that targets of LBOs in 
France display significantly higher growth rates in sales, assets and employment.  
 
All these findings do not necessarily reflect the influence of private equity investors as there is 
evidence that private equity-financed LBOs are quite different from other LBOs. Amess et al. 
(2008) find that employment shrinks only after LBOs that are not private equity financed. In 
contrast, Davis et al. (2008) find that employment growth in US firms after a LBO financed 
by private equity investors shrinks more rapidly than in their comparison group. Their 
approach however, is rather descriptive as they only control for industry, initial size and firm 
age. 
 
Only a few papers analyzed the effects of private equity financing on investment and 
investment-cash flow sensitivities - the standard measure to evaluate financial constraints. 
Manigart et al. (2003) use a panel data set for Belgium including 179 firms which have been 
financed by venture capital companies between 1987 and 1997 and a comparison group of 
223 non-private equity financed firms. Applying a modified sales accelerator model (Mairesse 
et al., 1999), the authors detect that venture backed firms display a slightly higher investment-
cash flow sensitivity than non-private equity financed firms. Nothing is known about 
differences in investment-cash flow sensitivities in the period before the private equity 
investments starts. Possibly, the investment-cash flow sensitivity of private equity financed 
firms is already larger in the period before the private equity investment. Reflecting this 
measurement issue the authors do not interpret their results as rejection of the above 
                                                 
7 Buyout financing has increased remarkably during the 1990s in the United Kingdom and in the first decade of 
the 21
st century in continental Europe (see Wright et al. 2006).   9
mentioned hypothesis. Instead, the authors argue that the empirical results confirm the general 
expectation that information asymmetries between private equity financed firms and creditors 
matter. The main question, whether these asymmetries are reduced or not remains unsolved.  
 
Bertoni et al. (2008) use a sample of 379 Italian new technology based firms, including 52 
firms that received early stage and/or expansion financing, within the period from 1994 to 
2003. The authors estimate an Euler equation (see Bond and Meghir, 1994) and apply a two-
step system GMM estimator to identify the effect of venture capital finance on investments of 
funded firms. In fact, the authors find that venture capital financed firms have a significantly 
higher investment rate than non-venture capital financed firms. In contrast to Manigart et al. 
(2003), investment-cash flow sensitivity for venture capital financed firms do not differ 
significantly from those of non-venture capital financed firm. While Manigart et al. (2003) do 
not consider differences in the investment rates of private equity financed firms compared 
with non-private equity financed firms, the results of both studies cannot be easily compared. 
It is possible that the significant higher investment-cash flow sensitivity in Manigart et al. 
(2003) is driven by higher investment spending of private equity financed firms.  
 
Several conclusions can be derived from these studies: First, the two studies that analyze the 
effect of venture capital on investment do not answer the question whether financing 
constraints are significantly reduced due to the inflow of venture capital finance. Second, 
findings are available for venture capital investments only. Nothing is known about the effects 
of private equity backed buyouts on investment spending and investment-cash flow 
sensitivities of funded firms. Third, comparable findings for the real economy across 
countries are missing, but a prerequisite to derive a general statement. Finally, the small 
numbers of private equity financed firms and the use of survey data may potentially imply 
some imprecision in the estimates.  
 
We tackle these research gaps with a particular interest in considering some of the above 
mentioned identification issues. We analyze investment rates and investment-cash flow 
sensitivity before and after private equity transaction undertaken by VCs and compare these 
findings with non-private equity financed firms. We differentiate between expansion and 
buyout financing and apply this methodology to two countries, namely the UK and France. It 
is commonly argued that VCs from well experienced markets like the US or UK venture 
capital market are more active in monitoring their firms and are more often engaged in hands-  10
on management than VCs from continental Europe (e.g., Wright et al., 2006; Bottazi et al., 
2008). Both countries may also be different with respect to firms seeking and receiving 
private equity.  
 
2.3  Predictions 
The efforts of VCs can affect (i) the level of investment spending of funded firms and (ii) the 
dependence of investment on internal finance. Related to the first one, private equity financed 
expansion may help to increase investment opportunities. Investment spending of private 
equity financed firms with expansion financing should be clearly higher than for the 
remaining firms. The investment spending of buyouts is expected to be different from targets 
of expansion financing. Above mentioned empirical evidence suggests that after a buyout, the 
operating performance usually increases, but capital expenditures have sometimes found to be 
declining (e.g., Kaplan, 1989).  
 
Concerning the dependence of investment on internal finance, monitoring and management 
support may reduce some kind of agency costs based on information asymmetries between 
shareholders and management. These efforts as well as capital infusion may provide strong 
signals for uninformed third parties. Capital infusion provides additional liquidity and offers 
increased securities for debt finance from creditors. Monitoring and management support 
allow a better control of the assignment of external resources for investment projects. If 
signaling effects work, investment-cash flow sensitivities should be reduced.  
 
Considering Jensen’s “free cash flow” theory, one may conclude that management support 
and monitoring additionally have a direct effect on investment-cash flow sensitivities in firms 
with over-investment. Managers of organizations with high levels of free cash flow
8, but low 
growth opportunities, tend to waste free cash flow for less profitable projects to realize their 
own non-value maximizing objectives. This overinvestment implies a positive relation 
between the investment rate and cash flow. Jensen (1986) argued that debt may have an 
important control function in those organizations, because repayment of debts limits the free 
cash flow. In a similar manner, effective monitoring of equity holders may have a similar 
effect under specific circumstances. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) point out that shareholder 
                                                 
8 Free cash flow is operating cash flow minus cash flow from investment activity. The free cash flow can be used 
to buy back stocks or to payout dividends to shareholders.    11
with sufficiently large equity positions can gain more from information about the firm than 
those with very small equity positions. VCs often acquire high equity shares, thus incentives 
to play an active role in funded firms are very high. In fact, target firms of buyout financing 
might match the characteristics of firms with large “free cash flow” and low growth 
opportunities better than private equity financed firms with expansion financing. As a result, 
the active role of VCs may reduce investment-cash flow sensitivities in buyout firms 
additionally.  
 
Private equity financed buyout transactions may also have a conflictive effect. The high 
amount of debt used to finance a private equity buyout transaction, which is usually secured 
by the portfolio firm´s assets or future cash flows, may lead to a worse access to external 
finance and increase the probability of firm distress. The remarkable increase in debt to assets 
ratios may limit the control function of debt in buyout based organizations. Such a control 
function is only feasible if the access to external financial resources in the next period is not 
affected by the increased debt level.  
 
Based on these theoretical considerations we expect that investment-cash flow sensitivities are 
significantly reduced for private equity financed firms with expansion financing. 
Contrariwise, the effect on investment-cash flow sensitivities for buyout firms is ambiguous 
from a theoretical point of view. 
3  Empirical approach 
Empirical tests for imperfections in capital markets are usually based on the estimation of 
investment-cash flow sensitivities. In a variety of alternative investment models, a 
significantly positive relationship between cash flow and investment can – under specific 
circumstances – be interpreted as evidence for financial constraints. In incomplete financial 
markets external sources of financing are more expensive than internal sources. The higher 
the cost premium for external finance, the higher a firm’s preference for internal financial 
resources. Since for a financially constrained firm external finance is not available or only 
available at prohibitively high costs, it will only invest if it has sufficient internal funds 
available. 
   12
Based on theoretical contributions about asymmetric information in capital markets, Fazzari 
et al. (1988) present a pioneer work to test for the degree of capital markets imperfections 
empirically. The authors applied a so called Q-model to estimate the relationship between 
investment and cash flow. Under certain assumptions on a firm’s cost function
9, average Q – 
the ratio of a firm´s intrinsic value to the replacement cost of its assets – equals the 
unobserved shadow price of capital and should be a sufficient statistic for investment in the 
absence of financing constraints. The authors show that given the assumptions on a firm’s 
cost function, the sensitivity of investment to internal funds is monotonically increasing with 
financial constraints faced by the firm. A proxy for Q is usually constructed from stock 
market valuations. The authors split their sample of US manufacturing firms according to 
their dividend policy in four classes. Their a priori expectation that firms paying lower 
dividends suffer mostly from financing constraints is consistent with their empirical results of 
higher investment-cash flow sensitivities among these firms.  
 
A fundamental critique on the assumption of monotonicity regarding investment-cash flow 
sensitivities and financing constraints is formulated by Kaplan and Zingales (1997). The 
authors present a counter example in a theoretical model where a priori more financially 
constrained firms are characterized by lower investment-cash flow sensitivities than a priori 
less financially constrained firms, and find some empirical support for this prediction. Bond 
and van Reenen (2008) discuss the critique in detail and argue that the findings of Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997) only apply to static and not to dynamic investment models that are usually 
chosen in empirical investigations. Furthermore, the a priori expectation of financially 
constrained firms based on a subjective set of criteria and the small sample of Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997) may hamper the generalizability of their findings.
10 
 
The empirical implementation of the Q-model critically hinges on the assumption that stock 
market prices reflect expected discounted future profits. Among others, Schiantarelli (1996) 
and Hubbard (1998) argue that stock markets might not be efficient and stock price data could 
be a very imprecise proxy. Recently, Cummins et al. (2006) show that after controlling for 
                                                 
9 The adjustment cost function is for example assumed to be homogenous of degree one in investment and 
capital. Most empirical implementations of the Q model are based on quadratic adjustment costs (see Bond and 
van Reenen 2008 for a discussion).  
10 A similar critique can be also derived from Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis. As mentioned in the 
previous section, management-led firms with free cash flow and ineffective corporate governance mechanisms 
may tend to over-invest and thus, the investment rate is positively related with cash flow.   13
analysts’ forecasts in the regression –which they argue is a more precise proxy for expected 
discounted future profits– cash flow is no longer significantly related to investment 
spending.
11 However, Carpenter and Guariglia (2008) as well as Agca and Mozumdar (2008a) 
show that the results from Cummins et al. (2006) are not robust to small changes in the model 
specification and the time period investigated. Further, it should be noted that the firms used 
in the sample by Cummins et al. (2006) are listed companies with an average value of sales 
above 3 billion US $, which are arguably not the firms that are most likely to be financially 
constrained.   
 
Due to the potential problems of the Q model and its non-applicability to unquoted firms, 
many researchers prefer alternative econometric approaches which avoid the use of stock 
price data. Bond and Meghir (1994) apply an Euler equation and extent the model to consider 
imperfections in product and financial markets. Both Euler equation and Q-models follow 
from a firm´s dynamic optimization problem and assume convex adjustment costs.  
 
Many empirical studies find, however, large adjustments in firm-level data and thus, the 
assumption of convex adjustment costs might be violated (see Bond and van Reenen 2008 for 
details). Due to these problems, reduced form models like error-correction models (see e.g. 
Harhoff 1998, Mairesse et al. 1999, Bond et al. 2003) and dynamic versions of sales 
accelerator models (see Harhoff 1998, Manigart et al. 2002), which can be interpreted as an 
approximation to an unknown complex adjustment process, have been used increasingly in 
the last years. The restrictive assumption of convex adjustment costs is relaxed, but may 
induce the problem that cash flow can potentially be correlated with unobserved expected 
future profitability if the adjustment process is not described adequately. However, Bond et al. 
(2003) show that the ability of cash flow to forecast future cash flow or sales does not differ 
remarkably across groups of firms that are assumed to be differently affected by liquidity 
constraints. Hence, even if cash flow conveys some information about investment 
opportunities,  differences in investment-cash flow sensitivities are a valid indicator for 
differences in the importance of financing constraints across groups of firms.  
 
Since a lot of portfolio firms in our sample are unquoted and the severity of measurement 
error in Q models is an ongoing discussion, we do not consider this model. Instead, we apply 
                                                 
11 Bond et al. (2004) applied the same methodology for UK quoted firms and reach a similar conclusion.   14
a dynamic version of a sales accelerator model (see e.g., Harhoff, 1998; Mairesse et al., 1999) 
to investigate the impact of private equity on investment and financial constraints of portfolio 
firms. 
 
The dynamic sales accelerator model typically includes current and lagged sales growth, the 
lagged investment to capital ratio and cash flow or an alternative measure for internal finance. 
Since private equity investors might chose portfolio firms with high growth potential based on 
innovations, we control for lagged levels of intangible assets in our specification, to avoid a 
spurious correlation between private equity and investment of portfolio firms. For the same 
reason we also include banking debt, because firms selected by private equity investors might 
be confronted with credit rationing to a different extent than other firms before the acquisition 
and thus, may be characterized by different debt levels.  
 
Our basic empirical model is given by: 
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where Iit denotes gross investments in tangible fixed assets of firm i in year t, Ki,t-1 is the value 
of tangible fixed asset at the end of the previous year, t-1.   yit ( yi,t-1) is the contemporary 
(lagged) one-year change of the logarithm of sales, ITAi,t-1  denotes the lagged value of 
intangible assets, Bi,t-1 denotes the lagged value of long-term debt (which is predominantly 
banking debt), Cit is the current cash flow, Di is a firm-fixed effect, Zt contains period fixed 
effects and  it is an error term. Investment is computed as: 
,1 (1 ) it it it i t IK K δ − =− −
           
(2) 
where  it δ denotes the firm-specific rate of depreciation. Hence, our measure of investment 
explicitly allows for disinvestment and thus negative values of  it I . 
 
To discriminate between private equity and non-private equity backed firms we add a dummy 
variable for private equity-backed firms and an interaction term with the cash flow to capital 
ratio to the model:  
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 PEit is a time varying dummy variables which takes the value of one in all years we detected 
ownership of a venture capital company in firm i. PEit  Cit / Ki,t-1 measures the cash flow to 
capital ratio of portfolio firms owned by venture capital companies.  
 
The main parameters of interest are  7 and  8. If we assume that investment-cash flow 
sensitivities are equal for all firms before private equity financing starts
12, a negative sign for 
 8 implies a reduction in investment-cash flow sensitivities, while a positive sign for the 
parameters implies an increase in investment-cash flow sensitivities and hence in financial 
constraints. Equation (3) is estimated for UK and French firms separately. In alternative 
specifications we differentiate private equity between expansion financing ( it EF ) and buyouts 
( it BO ). 
 
The individual effects in the investment equation are necessarily correlated with the lagged 
dependent variable, which causes OLS as well as random or fixed effects estimator to be 
inconsistent (see e.g. Baltagi 2001). To avoid these biases we use a Difference GMM 
estimator which eliminates firm-specific effects by differencing equation (3) and then use 
lagged values of the regressors as instruments as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). 
13  
 
The estimation procedure allows treating the explanatory variables as strictly exogenous, 
predetermined or endogenous. This implies that the explanatory variables are uncorrelated 
with all realizations of the error term, only correlated with past realizations of the error term 
or in addition correlated with present shocks, respectively. If the error term in equation (3) is 
serially uncorrelated, the error term in first differences follows a moving average process of 
order one. If this assumption holds and the model is correctly specified, one-period lagged 
levels of predetermined variables and two-periods lagged variables of endogenous variables 
are valid instruments. Similarly to the cash flow and sales growth variables, private equity 
financing might be endogenous as there might be feedback from past investment to future 
                                                 
12 We will test this assumption explicitly in this paper. 
13 An alternative estimator for dynamic panel data models is the GMM system estimator (Blundell and Bond 
1998) which has been found to be more efficient and less effected by weak instruments, especially in series that 
display high persistence, i.e. are close to a unit root. Unfortunately, our specification tests indicated that the 
additional assumptions regarding stationary and initial conditions of the variables were not met in our data. 
Further, we could reject unit roots for all variables in AR(1) models. We further found that for the estimates of 
the AR(1) processes with the difference GMM estimators were in all cases above the fixed effects estimator 
(which is biased downwards) and below the OLS estimator (which is biased upwards). Hence, we conclude that 
our results are not largely affected by weak instruments. Results are available upon request.   16
acquisitions by private equity investors, or these investors might select portfolio firms with 
higher unobserved future profitability. We will address this question carefully.  
 
We treat cash flow and current sales growth as endogenous and lagged intangible assets and 
bank debt as predetermined. We either treat PEit as exogenous or use lagged values of all 
regressors as instruments. In an alternative specification we use two year lagged values of 
ownership dispersion as an exclusion restriction. This variable is calculated as the Herfindahl 
index of equity shares across all owners. The higher the free float of a company´s shares or 
generally the more dispersed the shares of a company are across owners, the easier it should 
be for an external investor to acquire a firm. Hence, this variable should be negatively 
correlated with an acquisition by a private equity investor.  
 
As we exclude firms that belong to a corporate group or are subject to an industrial M&A, this 
variable picks up variation in ownership concentration that do not imply differences in control 
rights. Although one might argue that ownership concentration might be correlated with 
corporate governance mechanisms that may affect investment and liquidity, this should only 
be true of control relevant stakes.
14 We will explicitly test the validity of this additional 
instrument. In an amplification of the model we use the predicted probability of acquisition – 
estimated by a Probit model – as an alternative instrument. 
 
For estimation we use the more efficient two-step variant of the Difference GMM estimator, 
where the second-step estimation is based on weighted results from a consistent first-step 
estimator. To correct standard errors for heteroscedasticity and possible autocorrelation, the 
finite sample correction proposed by Windmeijer (2005) is applied in all GMM estimations.
15 
4  Data and Descriptives 
The data used in this paper is compiled from two different sources. The first one is the 
ZEPHYR database, an M&A database published by Bureau van Dijk. ZEPHYR includes data 
on M&As, IPOs, joint ventures and private equity transactions and provides information 
about the date and value of a deal, the source of financing as well as a description of the type 
                                                 
14 Empirical investigations indeed find that ownership concentration per se does not affect investment (see e.g. 
Audretsch and Elston (2002) for empirical evidence for German quoted firms). 
15 Estimation is based on the STATA program xtabond2 (Roodman 2003).   17
of transaction and the firms involved in the deal. Compared to other M&A data sources like 
Thompson Financial Securities data it has the advantage that there is no minimum deal value 
for a transaction to be included in the data base. When comparing aggregate statistics derived 
from own calculations of the ZEPHYR database with those from Thompson financial data we 




The second data set used is the AMADEUS database, a database that provides information on 
firms’ balance sheet and profit and loss accounts for up to ten years as well as ownership and 
subsidiary information. The financial data include balance sheet items and information from 
profit and loss accounts and are collected from company reports which are supplemented by 
specialized regional information providers. Further, among other variables, AMADEUS 
includes information about employment, industry, legal form and date of incorporation. The 
database has been used in numerous empirical firm-level studies.
17 Since we merged six 
updates (no. 64, 88, 113, 136, 146 and 168) of the database we are able to consider entry and 
exit of firms and thus a broader sample of firms to identify equity holdings of venture capital 
companies. Observations from the AMADEUS database are merged with the transaction data 
from ZEPYHR by a common firm identifier. Since the availability of balance sheet data 
varies considerably across countries, we restrict our analysis to firms from the UK and 
France. 
 
Based on the merged data set we identified target firms of  private equity transaction and 
deleted all firms that were involved in other mergers and acquisitions or belong to an 
industrial corporate geroup. For a private equity backed transaction either the business 
description of the acquirer or the financing of the deal had to indicate the involvement of 
private equity.
18 We used a combination of the description of the deal type and information 
about acquired and final stake of an acquirer to classify buyouts and expansion financing. We 
classified deals that indicated the use of development capital or a capital increase and the 
acquisition of a minority stake by a private equity investor as expansion financing. Buyouts 
where defined as transactions in which a private equity investor acquires a majority stake and 
                                                 
16 Results are available from the authors upon request. 
17Konings et al. (2003) apply the dataset to investigate financial constraints and company investment in 
transition countries. 
18 See the data appendix for details.   18
the description of the deal type indicated a buyout. Our definition of buyouts includes private 
equity backed management buyouts, but excludes non-private equity financed management 
buyouts.  
 
We performed some standard data cleaning procedures that are described in the data 
appendix. The available time period spans the years 1998 to 2007. Since our preferred 
estimation method is not applicable to panels with gaps and requires the availability of lagged 
values of the regressors, we only kept firms with at least three consecutive firm-year 
observations. Further, we only kept firms for which unconsolidated accounts were available 
and deleted firms with a median value of sales or total assets below € 2 million. 
 
Table 2 provides some summary statistics for the key variables used in this study (see Table 1 
for variable definitions). In contrast to many other studies for the UK and France (e.g. Bond et 
al. 2003), our sample contains a high share of small firms. In line with this observation, the 
investment to capital ratio as well as the cash flow to capital ratio is higher compared to these 
studies. In the UK, private equity backed firms are characterized by higher investment and 
cash flow to capital ratios than other firms, but this is not true for firms in France. Within both 
countries, private equity backed firms are on average larger and display higher levels of 
banking debt. 
 
The separate statistics for buyout firms and firms with expansion financing display a large 
heterogeneity of private equity backed firms. Only firms with expansion financing are 
characterized by higher investment rates than non-private equity financed firms. On average 
they are younger, but larger than other firms and are characterized by lower cash flow to 
capital ratios. Noticeably, the average growth rates of employment and sales are within both 
countries a multiple of those of non-private equity backed firms. The comparison of mean 
values further shows that targets of private equity financed buyouts are substantially larger 
than targets of expansion financing and non-private equity financed firms. They have lower 
investment rates than the average firm, are older and display similar growth rates of 
employment and sales. Cash flow to capital ratios of buyout firms are remarkable high, given 
that this ratio is usually declining with firm size. The level of leverage in private equity 
financed buyout firms in France and the UK is similar to remaining private equity financed 
firms. This indicates that private equity investors carefully assure that their portfolio firms do 
not become overindebted.   19
 
Private equity financed firms display a higher share of intangible assets which indicates 
higher innovation efforts. Table 3 suggests that this is at least partly driven by differences in 
the distribution of firms across industries. Relative to other firms, private equity-backed firms 
more often operate in knowledge and technology intensive industries in which innovation 
activities are more important. While buyouts are in general more concentrated in 
manufacturing industries, more than fifty percent of firms with expansion financing are 
located in knowledge intensive service sectors. The latter one may reflect the “new economy 
hype” since many expansion financed firms had business emphasis on services based on 
radical breakthroughs in new technologies (i.e. information and communication technologies). 
The structure of the unbalanced panel used for estimation is depicted in Table 4. It indicates 
that buyouts are much more common in the UK, where they account for two thirds of all 
private equity financed firms in the sample. In general, private equity financed transactions 
are much more present in the UK relative to the number of observations. This finding is 
consistent with aggregate statistics of venture capital markets published by the European 
Private Equity & Venture Capital Association.
19   
 
In Tables 5 and 6 results from Probit regressions for the probability of an acquisition are 
depicted. Within both countries, private equity investors choose firms with higher sales 
growth and intangible assets, while a high concentration of ownership reduces the probability 
of an acquisition. A high cash flow ratio is positively associated with a buyout, but negatively 
correlated with future expansion financing. This seems plausible, as firms with low cash flow 
need capital infusion to exploit growth opportunities and firms with high cash flow are those 
where we expect a lower level of growth opportunities, but a higher capacity of handling 
increased debt levels.     
5  Results  
In Table 7 results from simple OLS and fixed effects regressions of our investment model are 
presented. These models do not account for endogeneity of the covariates and do not properly 
control for the dynamics in the investment decision. In particular, OLS and fixed effect 
regressions produce a biased estimate for the lagged dependent variable that also affects the 
                                                 
19 See e.g. EVCA (2008). Note that average firm size is higher in our sample of British firms. However, this 
observation holds for different size classes.   20
estimates of the other coefficients. Furthermore, the coefficients of the other variables may be 
biased due to correlation with unobserved factors. The results of previous studies indicate that 
investment-cash flow sensitivities are biased downwards in OLS and fixed effects models due 
to simultaneity (see e.g. Bond et al. 2003). Hence, the results in table 7 rather serve as a 
benchmark for the GMM estimation described in section 3. In both countries we see that 
private equity financed firms are characterized by a significantly lower investment-cash flow 
sensitivity as well as a significantly higher investment rate. As columns (2) and (4) show, 
within-firm variation in private equity ownership is correlated with within-firm variation in 
investment spending and a lower correlation between variation  in investment spending and 
variation in cash flow.  
 
In Table 8 and 9 results from the Difference-GMM estimations are reported. The test statistics 
show that the validity of our instruments cannot be rejected at conventional significance levels 
as the Arellano-Bond test does not indicate autocorrelation of second order and the Hansen 
test does not reject the orthogonality of our instruments to the error term. Column (1) shows 
results were the private equity dummy is treated as exogenous, in column (2) the dummy 
variable is solely instrumented by lagged values of the regressors. In columns (3) we use in 
addition ownership dispersion (Own) lagged two periods and more and in column (4) we use 
the predicted probability of acquisition,  ˆ (1 ) t Pr PE Δ= . Additional moment restrictions are 
created by lags of interaction terms of these additional instruments with the cash flow to 
capital ratio. 
 
In both countries we fail to reject the hypothesis that private equity transactions are 
exogenous to the investment equation as indicated by the Difference-in-Hansen test in column 
(1). The general impression is that the results from the simple OLS and fixed effects 
regressions are confirmed: private equity transactions are associated with higher investment 
spending and a lower dependency of investment to internal funds of a similar magnitude in 
France and the UK. Interestingly, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the cash flow 
sensitivity of private equity financed firms ( 68 ββ + in equation (3) in section 3) is zero. This 
indicates that private equity financing offers the chance to alleviate liquidity constraints 
sharply.  
 
The estimation results suggest that within both countries a change in private equity ownership 
leads to a change in investment spending of approximately 25% for firms with a zero change   21
in the cash flow to capital ratio. The overall effect of private equity investors is declining with 
an increasing change in the cash flow to capital ratio, approaching zero for a value of   
,1 (/ ) it i t CK − Δ  close to 1.
20 Treating  , it PE  as endogenous does not alter our conclusion 
substantially. The estimates for the coefficient of  it PE  are a little higher, but the confidence 
intervals are clearly overlapping. The estimates for the coefficients of the interaction terms 
with cash flow are quite similar.  We can neither reject exogeneity of  it PE  in column (1) nor 
of our additional instruments in columns (2)-(4). Further, the Hansen tests for the validity of 
the lagged levels of the regressors as instruments and the autocorrelation test do not reject the 
validity of the instruments. We can fairly conclude that our results are not primarily driven by 
the endogeneity of private equity backed acquisitions.
21  
 
Irrespective from this positive effect of private equity financing on average, the debate about 
regulation of private equity financed deals focuses rather on buyouts than on expansion 
financing of private equity backed firms. Therefore, in Tables 10 and 11, we present findings 
for expansion financing and buyouts separately. In France, we see that only expansion 
financing affects investment and investment-cash flow sensitivities significantly, while in the 
UK both buyouts and expansion financing have a significant impact. Thus it seems that 
expansion financing clearly spurs investment and reduces financial constraints while the 
evidence for buyouts is mixed. Neither lower nor higher investment-cash flow sensitivities for 
buyout firms are detected in France.
22 
 
The degree of financial constraints is usually found to be quite heterogeneous across different 
groups of firms and it is often argued that it is higher for small firms. To check whether the 
impact of private equity investors differs across firms of different size, we estimated separate 
regressions for firms with a median value of total assets below and above 30 million € 
respectively.
23 The results are depicted in columns (2) and (3) of Table 10 and 11. We see that 
                                                 
20 This value is beyond the 95%-quantile of 
,1 (/ ) it i t CK − Δ  within both countries. 
21 Results of a Hausman tests  in which we compared the model in column (1) to the alternative specifications 
did not indicate invalidity of this specification as well.  
22 As the previous results did not indicate that endogeneity of private equity backed transactions is a severe 
problem in the Difference GMM estimations, we only present results that assume exogeneity of private equity 
for the heterogeneous effects. However, treating private equity as predetermined or endogenous yielded similar 
although less precisely determined coefficients.  
23 This threshold was chosen in order to ensure a sufficient number of firms with buyout financing and firms 
with expansion financing for each size class in both countries. While only a small fraction of firms without   22
the cash flow sensitivity of larger French firms is very small and not significantly different 
from zero, while it remains positive and significant for larger firms in the UK, although the 
coefficient is lower than for the group of smaller firms. This is line with Bond et al. (2003), 
who find significantly positive cash flow sensitivities for firms in the UK but insignificant 
cash flow sensitivities for French firms using a sample of predominantly large, publicly listed 
firms. Relationship banking that characterizes bank-based financial systems is often argued to 
be more effective in reducing information asymmetries than market based financial systems. 
 
In both countries the effect of private equity investors and most importantly the interaction 
with cash flow is only significant for the sample of smaller firms. This finding is consistent 
with our interpretation that the effect of private equity investors on investment mainly stems 
from the reduction of financial constraints which are arguably more severe for smaller firms. 
For the subgroup of smaller firms, the results from the regressions presented in tables 8 and 9 
are confirmed. Expansion financing is associated with higher investment and lower cash flow 
sensitivities in both countries, while the effect of buyouts is only significant for firms in the 
UK. All in all, the results indicate that expansion financing by venture capitalist can spur 
investment and alleviate financing constraints in portfolio firms, while buyouts do at least not 
undermine investment.  
 
We can only speculate about the reasons behind this difference between France and the UK. 
On the one hand, targets of buyouts in France and the UK can be different in certain attributes 
like financial soundness, growth opportunities and attitudes of the owners or the management. 
On the other hand, the supply side conditions, namely the size and structure of private equity 
markets differ between both countries (see e.g., Wright et al. 2006). Since the UK private 
equity market has a long history of financing buyouts, one may argue that the UK market 
defines specific needs and capabilities to improve the allocation of financial resources as well 
as the efficiency in the corporate sector.  
One potential concern is that first-differencing does not remove unobserved heterogeneity that 
interacts with other regressors, especially cash flow. Put differently, if private equity backed 
firms display different responses of investment to cash flow before an acquisition, our results 
might be misleading. To investigate this issue we compared investment-cash flow sensitivities 
of firms that receive private equity in the future, with other firms. Therefore we created a 
                                                                                                                                                          
private equity financing in our sample has a value of total assets above 30 million € this is not true of private 
equity backed firms.   23
dummy variable  it PREPE  that equals one for firms without private equity ownership at time t 
that received private equity later in our sample period and interacted this variable with cash 
flow. We excluded firm-years with private equity ownership from the sample. The results are 
depicted in table 12.
24 We see that within both countries investment-cash flow sensitivities of 
firms receiving private equity are not significantly different from other firms, although the 
coefficient is negative. Thus it seems that the differences in investment cash flow sensitivities 
of private equity backed firms arise after an acquisition takes place.  
 
Our results so far crucially depend on the ability of cash flows sensitivities within fixed 
effects and difference GMM models to identify financial constraints. As argued by Cummins 
et al. (2006) cash flow might be correlated with fundamental firm characteristics that are a 
predictor for future profitability and hence investment opportunities. This might be a problem, 
if the ability of cash flow to predict future profitability varies across private equity backed 
firm and other firms. To investigate this issue we follow Bond et al. (2003) and estimate 
simple forecasting models for future cash flow including all regressors from the investment 
model on the right hand side. Results in Table 13 show that the ability of cash flow to forecast 
future cash flow is not significantly different for private equity backed firms in the UK 
compared to other firms. The coefficient is only weakly significant in France and the small 
magnitude of the coefficient indicates that the different role of cash flow to forecast future 
profitability for private equity backed firm and other firms is unlikely to be the predominant 
explanation for the differences in investment-cash flow sensitivities.  
 
Another concern is that firms with persistent negative cash flows might display a low 
sensitivity of internal funds to investment as they might be unable to adjust investments to 
changes to changes in internal financial resources (see e.g. Brown and Petersen 2009). This 
might be a problem in our analysis if firms with negative cash flow might be distributed 
unequally across private equity backed firms and other firms. However, excluding firm-year 
observations with negative cash flow from our sample did not change our results notably.  We 
performed several further robustness checks, in which we ran regressions that contain an 
interaction of the private equity dummy with other regressors or an interaction of lagged size 
(total assets) with cash flow. These alternative specifications did not alter our main 
                                                 
24 The model does not contain a level effect, as the dummy variable is time invariant within the estimation 
sample.    24
conclusions.
25 All in all, the results indicate that on average, private equity investors have the 
potential to reduce financial constraints in portfolio firms and buyouts do at least not enhance 
liquidity constraints.  
 
6  Conclusion 
While positive impacts of start up financing from private equity investors on the growth of 
portfolio firms are mostly accepted among policy makers and researchers, the impact of 
private equity financed buyouts on portfolio firms is subject to a controversial debate.  
 
Using a large panel data set of French and British firms this paper analyzes the effects of both 
buyouts and expansion financing provided by venture capital companies on investment 
spending and the dependence of investment on internal finance in portfolio firms. We find 
that private equity financed firms in the UK and France are characterized by higher 
investment spending and a lower sensitivity of investment to internal finance. Using dynamic 
panel data and instrument variable techniques we find that neither unobserved heterogeneity 
nor endogeneity of private equity transactions are likely to be the predominant explanation for 
this finding. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that an acquisition by private equity 
investors is exogenous in our investment equations. Since investment spending of private 
equity financed firms is similar to other firms before the event of a private equity transaction, 
the lower investment-cash flow sensitivity of these firms indicate a reduction of financial 
constraints after the acquisition. 
 
While we find that expansion financing spurs investment in both countries, buyouts have a 
positive impact on investment in the UK and no impact on investment in France. Consistent 
with the view that small and medium sized enterprises are mostly affected by financial 
constraints, we find that private equity is only associated with higher investment and lower 
investment-cash flow sensitivities for these firms. Hence, in contrast to the notion of several 
policy makers we do not find any evidence that private equity financed buyouts aggravate 
financial constraints in portfolio firms. 
 
                                                 
25 Results of robustness checks are not reported to save space but are available upon request.   25
A useful extension of our analysis would be to examine the impact of private equity financed 
transactions on other measures of firm performance such as productivity or (employment) 
growth. Further, it might be interesting whether our results also extent to R&D expenditures 
or other investment types of intangible nature, which are even more dependent on financial 
structure and to decompose the effects of buyouts to the degree of debt that is used in the 
transaction. Regarding the remarkable cross-country differences in the effects of buyouts it 
would be interesting to analyse sources of the differences in detail. In this paper we can only 
speculate whether the outperformance of UK buyouts is driven by unobserved heterogeneity 
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Appendix 
Table 1: variable definitions 
 




Investment (=purchases - sales of tangible fixed assets) /capital stock
cash flow / capital stock
one year (logarithmic) sales growth rate
intangibles assets / capital stock
long term debt / capital stock
total assets total assets
employees number of employees
K capital stock (tangible fixed assets)
sales sales 
emp growth one year (logarithmic) employment growth rate
age firm age in years
PE =1, for firms with private equity ownership
EF =1, for firms with private equity ownership after expansion financing
BO =1, for firms with private equity ownership after buyout financing
Note: all monetary variables are measured in 1000€ in prices of the year 2000
1 / tt IK −
1 / tt CK −
t y Δ
11 / tt ITA K −−
11 / tt B K −−
mean median mean median mean median mean median
0.190 0.095 0.239 0.147 0.360 0.212 0.192 0.128
0.463 0.261 0.785 0.561 0.315 0.276 0.966 0.656
0.026 0.031 0.053 0.057 0.079 0.082 0.043 0.043
0.032 0.000 0.087 0.000 0.105 0.000 0.081 0.000
0.437 0.161 1.071 0.141 1.281 0.393 0.992 0.089
sales 27,803 11,997 46,504 24,718 36,003 14,773 50,557 29,308
employees 185 84 341 169 237 105 381 184
emp growth 0.012 0.008 0.036 0.026 0.073 0.062 0.022 0.021
K 5,779 1,972 6,460 2,685 6,864 1,859 6,304 2,958
total assets 15,991 6,976 27,313 15,843 23,534 10,333 28,771 18,656
age 28 21 21 14 15 10 23 16
mean median mean median mean median mean median
0.278 0.129 0.248 0.114 0.322 0.149 0.167 0.095
0.834 0.593 0.718 0.652 0.338 0.456 1.130 0.818
0.054 0.047 0.108 0.070 0.161 0.111 0.049 0.043
1.216 0.047 2.597 0.228 3.474 0.393 1.605 0.152
0.155 0.000 0.329 0.000 0.353 0.000 0.303 0.000
sales 31,906 8,197 47,025 13,625 29,018 6,068 67,389 27,476
employees 137 46 273 78 153 45 401 149
emp growth 0.023 0.000 0.041 0.011 0.072 0.041 0.010 0.000
K 6,686 511 12,206 1,040 11,436 523 13,081 2,074
total assets 15,132 4,608 39,982 15,230 27,467 9,102 54,031 23,275
age 25 20 24 15 16 9 32 24
IBO=1
Note: all monetary variables are measured in 1000€ in prices of the year 2000




1 / tt IK −
1 / tt CK −
t y Δ
11 / tt ITA K −−
11 / tt BK −−
1 / tt IK −
1 / tt CK −
t y Δ
11 / tt ITA K −−
11 / tt BK −−
1 / tt IK −
1 / tt CK −
t y Δ
11 / tt ITA K −−
11 / tt BK −−
1 / tt IK −
1 / tt CK −
t y Δ
11 / tt ITA K −−
11 / tt BK −−  31
Table 3: Industry distribution: share of firms across industry types 
  
Table 4: Number of firms and observations 
 
     
 
  
hightech lowtech knowledge intense other
PE 15.43 23.03 38.73 22.82
EF 11.64 18.55 53.14 16.67
France BO 20.04 27.37 23.6 28.99
Non-PE 6.17 19.72 15.66 58.46
PE 14.87 22.7 28.93 33.5
EF 7.87 16.75 51.27 24.11
UK BO 17.56 25.23 19.88 37.34
Non-PE 6.37 20.39 15.78 57.46
Manufacturing Services
Notes: Classification based on NACE two-digit industry code. Manufacturing, hightech:  24, 29, 31, 33- 35; Manufatcturing, 
lowtech: 15-23, 25-27, 30, 32, 36, 37  knowledge intensive services: 40, 41, 61, 62, 64, 70-74 other services: 45, 50-52, 55, 60, 
63, 90, 92, 93
Firms Observations PE=1 EF=1 BO=1
3 2096 6288 384 207 183
4 3694 14776 500 296 228
5 2043 10215 435 255 200
6 1504 9024 384 192 204
7 4337 30359 518 252 287
8 4411 35288 576 232 352
all 18085 105950 2797 1434 1454
Firms Observations PE=1 EF=1 BO=1
3 1502 4,506 252 65 190
4 1753 7,012 338 132 206
5 1176 5,880 339 100 244
6 828 4,968 324 54 270
7 1609 11,263 658 133 532
8 675 5,400 328 80 248
all 7543 39029 2239 564 1690
France
UK  32
Table 5:  Probit models for acquisition by Private Equity investors, British firms 
 
















N 39029 39029 39029
LogLikelihood -3211 -1290 -2209
LR-Test 0.000 0.000 0.000
 Notes: ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are shown in 
parantheses. In all colums time dummies are included.
23 / tt I K −−
23 / tt CF K −−
2 t Own −
2 t y − Δ
23 / tt ITA K −−















N 105950 105950 105950
LogLikelihood -2102 -1092 -1255
LR-Test 0.000 0.000 0.000
 Notes: ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are shown in 
parantheses. In all colums time dummies are included.
23 / tt I K −−
23 / tt CF K −−
2 t Own −
2 t y − Δ
23 / tt ITA K −−
23 / tt B K −−  33





UK UK France France
OLS FE OLS FE
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )
0.0853*** -0.1361*** 0.0375*** -0.0932***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
0.0926*** 0.0905*** 0.0498*** 0.1022***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
0.2178*** 0.1609*** 0.3248*** 0.1701***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
0.0799*** 0.0588*** 0.1954*** 0.1512***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
0.0757*** 0.0818*** 0.0682*** 0.1206***
(0.013) (0.027) (0.017) (0.036)
-0.0665*** -0.0617*** -0.0276*** -0.0573***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009)
-0.0968*** 0.0832 -0.0000 0.0018***
(0.023) (0.061) (0.000) (0.000)
0.0039*** 0.0216*** -0.0006 0.0075
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
N 39029 39029 105950 105950
F-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.0899 0.0701 0.0568 0.0709
 Notes: ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. Robust standard errors, clustered at the 
firm level, are shown in parantheses. In all colums time dummies are included.
1 / tt t PE C K − ⋅
12 / tt I K −−
1 / tt CK −
t y Δ
t PE
11 / tt ITA K −−
11 / tt B K −−
1 t y − Δ  34
Table 8: GMM first differences – British firms 
 
   
UK UK UK UK
(1) (2) (3) (4)
0.0348*** 0.0357*** 0.0364*** 0.0341***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
0.2462*** 0.2466*** 0.2340*** 0.2253***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024)
0.1315*** 0.1343*** 0.1458*** 0.1415***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018)
0.0210* 0.0224* 0.0267** 0.0266**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
0.2506*** 0.3777** 0.3819** 0.3173**
(0.058) (0.148) (0.173) (0.156)
-0.1898*** -0.1866*** -0.1877*** -0.2488***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.066) (0.062)
0.0505 0.0552 0.1696 0.0385
(0.289) (0.289) (0.275) (0.269)
0.0168* 0.0171** 0.0170** 0.0158*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
N 39029 39029 39029 39029
m1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 0.562 0.498 0.485 0.588
Hansen 0.224 0.236 0.276 0.169
Diff-Hansen 0.298 0.236 0.514 0.660
IV for 
 Notes: ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. Robust standard errors are shown in 
parantheses. m1 (m2) is a test of the  null hypothesis of no first (second) order serial correlation. Hansen is a 
test on the overidentifying restrictions based on the two-step GMM estimator.  Diff-Hansen is a tests of the 
validity of the moment restrictions based on the instruments used in addition to the lagged levels of the 
regressors.   For all test statistics, p-values are reported.
12 / tt I K −−
1 / tt CK −
t y Δ
t PE
1 / tt t PE C K − ⋅
11 / tt ITA K −−
11 / tt B K −−
2 t Own − t PE Δ t PE Δ (2,5) t PE ˆ (1 ) t Pr PE Δ=
1 t y − Δ  35




France France France France
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )
0.0480* 0.0519* 0.0592** 0.0530*
(0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.027)
0.1831*** 0.1792*** 0.1754*** 0.1793***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
0.3886*** 0.3593*** 0.3393*** 0.3673***
(0.109) (0.109) (0.116) (0.114)
0.0453** 0.0444** 0.0399** 0.0463**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
0.2533*** 0.3163** 0.2803** 0.2740**
(0.055) (0.158) (0.132) (0.127)
-0.1904*** -0.1868*** -0.1850*** -0.1860***
(0.027) (0.029) (0.049) (0.051)
0.0011*** 0.0011*** 0.0011*** 0.0011***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-0.0079 -0.0084 -0.0080 -0.0073
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
N 105950 105950 105950 105950
m1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 0.979 0.880 0.678 0.841
Hansen 0.241 0.250 0.151 0.143
Diff-Hansen 0.193 0.728 0.564 0.358
additional IV
 Notes: ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. Robust standard errors are shown in 
parantheses. m1 (m2) is a test of the  null hypothesis of no first (second) order serial correlation. Hansen is 
a test on the overidentifying restrictions based on the two-step GMM estimator. Diff-Hansen are tests of 
the overidentifying restrictions of the instrument subsets. For all test statistics, p-values are reported.
1 / tt t PE C K − ⋅
12 / tt I K −−
1 / tt CK −
t y Δ
t PE
11 / tt ITA K −−
11 / tt B K −−
2 t Own − t PE Δ (2,5) t PE ˆ (1 ) t Pr PE Δ=
1 t y − Δ  36




























N 39029 33818 5211
m1 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 0.666 0.429 0.175
Hansen 0.512 0.668 0.878
Diff-Hansen 0.233 0.393 0.934
 Notes: ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. Robust standard 
errors are shown in parantheses. m1 (m2) is a test of the  null hypothesis of no first 
(second) order serial correlation. Hansen is a test on the overidentifying restrictions 
based on the two-step GMM estimator. Diff-Hansen are tests of the validity of the 
moment restrictions generated by the assumption of exogeneity of BO and EF. For 
all test statistics, p-values are reported.
12 / tt I K −−
1 / tt CK −
t y Δ
t EF
1 / tt t EF C K − ⋅
t BO
1 / tt t BOCK − ⋅
11 / tt ITA K −−
11 / tt B K −−
1 t y − Δ  37


























N 105950 101657 4293
m1 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 0.805 0.748 0.112
Hansen 0.259 0.364 0.856
Diff-Hansen 0.912 0.542 0.728
 Notes: ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. Robust standard 
errors are shown in parantheses. m1 (m2) is a test of the  null hypothesis of no first 
(second) order serial correlation. Hansen is a test on the overidentifying restrictions 
based on the two-step GMM estimator. Diff-Hansen are tests of the validity of the 
moment restrictions generated by the assumption of exogeneity of BO and EF. For 
all test statistics, p-values are reported.
12 / tt I K −−
1 / tt CK −
t y Δ
t EF
1 / tt t EF C K − ⋅
t BO
1 / tt t BOCK − ⋅
11 / tt ITA K −−
11 / tt B K −−
1 t y − Δ  38
Table 12: Private Equity backed firms before the acquisition 
 
 




0.0329*** (0.010) 0.0762*** (0.028)
0.2374*** (0.027) 0.1914*** (0.016)
0.1250*** (0.019) 0.2674** (0.123)
0.0155 (0.012) 0.0231 (0.020)
-0.0587 (0.080) -0.0773 (0.116)
0.3839 (0.304) 0.0011*** (0.000)





 Notes: ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. Robust standard errors 
are shown in parantheses. m1 (m2) is a test of the  null hypothesis of no first (second) 
order serial correlation. Hansen is a test on the overidentifying restrictions based on the 
two-step GMM estimator. Diff-Hansen are tests of the overidentifying restrictions of 













12 / tt IK −−
1 / tt CK −
t y Δ
1 / tt t PREPE C K − ⋅
11 / tt ITA K −−
11 / tt B K −−
1 t y − Δ
0.6315*** (0.002) 0.7018*** (0.002)
-0.0179 (0.034) 0.1046*** (0.033)
-0.0017 (0.013) -0.0199* (0.011)
-0.2051*** (0.008) -0.3339*** (0.004)
-0.0121 (0.013) 0.0382*** (0.012)
0.0298*** (0.011) 0.0573*** (0.011)
0.2198*** (0.037) 0.0016*** (0.000)




 Notes: ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. 






1 / tt t PE C K − ⋅
1 / tt I K −
1 / tt CK −
t PE
t y Δ
1 t y − Δ
1 / tt B K −
1 / tt ITA K −  39
Data Appendix 
Data cleaning and sample selection 
Firms with missing information on key variables like cash flow, investment or sales growth 
were deleted from the sample. A few observations had to be dropped because of implausible 
values such as negative values for sales or the capital stock or a value of fixed assets greater 
than total assets. Further, the upper and lower 1%-quantile of sales growth and the investment 
to capital ratio as well as the upper 1%-quantile of the long term debt to total assets ratio were 
deleted. Values of the cash flow to capital ratio above 5 were deleted from the sample to 
eliminate coding errors and outliers. All monetary variables are measured in 1000 € and in 
prices of the year 2000. We excluded firms that were subject to a merger or acquisition or a 
management buyout that did not involve a private equity firm or were part of an industrial 
corporate group at the beginning of our sample period. Firms from the primary sector (NACE 
two-digit industry 01-14), holding companies (NACE 7415), financial companies (NACE 65-
67), firms from public sectors (NACE75, 80, 91) as well as firms with a legal form that is not 
public or private limited were excluded. Further we only kept firms with a median value of 
annual sales and total assets above 2 million €, based on all available firm-year observations, 
to ensure a minimum of comparability of portfolio firms and our comparison group. 
 
Classification of private equity backed transactions 
To identify private equity transactions, three steps where performed. The first was to define 
potential private equity firms by the business description. In particular the business 
description had to include spelling variants of at least one of the following words: private 
equity, venture capital, venture partner, risk capital, seed capital, seed fund, private fund, 
corporate venturing, angel investment or buyout fund. The NACE classification is not 
appropriate for the classification of private equity investors, because in many cases it is not 
possible to differentiate private equity investors from pension funds or holding companies by 
the industry code. In the second step we used information about the financing of a deal. We 
classified transactions as private equity backed if the description of the financing of the deal 
included one of the words development capital, private equity, venture capital, angel 
investment or leveraged buyout. For a private equity backed transaction either the business 
description or the financing of the deal had to indicate the involvement of private equity. 
However, we deleted targets of transactions with unknown deal financing, or a deal financing 
that indicated seed financing. Similarly we dropped targets from the sample if we could not 
classify the final stake of the acquirer as minority or majority. In the third step we classified   40
buyouts as private equity backed transactions in which the deal description included the word 
buyout and the acquirer acquired a majority stake. We classified transactions as expansion 
financing if they involved the acquisition of a minority stake and the financing of the deal did 
not indicate buyout activity. We dropped targets of transactions that did not fit into this 
profile, e.g. buyouts with a minority stake, expansion financing with a majority stake or cases 
in which the description of the deal type indicated a buyout, but the description of the 
financing of the deal indicated the use of development capital.  
 
 
 